BASEL III MONITORING EXERCISE — RESULTS BASED ON DATA AS OF 30 June 2019

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Abbreviations

AMA	advanced measurement approach
ASF	available stable funding
BCBS	Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BI	business indicator
BIC	business indicator component
CCB	capital conservation buffer
CCP	central counterparty
CET1	Common Equity Tier 1
CRD	Capital Requirements Directive
CRR	Capital Requirements Regulation
CVA	credit valuation adjustment
EBA	European Banking Authority
EEA	European Economic Area
EU	European Union
FRTB	fundamental review of the trading book
G-SII	global systemically important institution
HQLA	high-quality liquid assets
ILM	internal loss multiplier
IMA	internal model approach
IQR	interquartile range
IRB	internal ratings-based
LC	loss component
LCR	liquidity coverage ratio
LR	leverage ratio
LRE	leverage ratio exposure
MRC	minimum required capital
NSFR	net stable funding ratio
O-SII	other systemically important institution
OBS	off-balance sheet exposures
OpRisk	operational risk
QIS	quantitative impact study
RSF	required stable funding
RWA	risk-weighted assets
SA	standardised approach
SMA	standardised measurement approach
T1	Tier 1

Executive summary

This latest Basel III monitoring exercise report is based on June 2019 data and provides an assessment of the impact of the full implementation of final Basel III reforms on European Economic Area banks (EEA). Given the June 2019 reporting date, the results do not reflect the economic impact of the coronavirus disease (Covid-19) on participating banks. Where relevant, the revised implementation dates of the final Basel III framework, as agreed on 27 March 2020, are reflected in this report[1].

The reforms mostly affect the frameworks for credit risk, operational risk (OpRisk) and leverage ratio (LR). Importantly, they also introduce the aggregate output floor. In this report, the credit risk impact is separately attributed to the standardised approach (SA) and the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach. The report also quantifies the impact of the new version of the standards for the market risk (the fundamental review of the trading book — FRTB), as set out in January 2019[2]. The changes on credit valuation adjustment (CVA) are also assessed. In addition, in conjunction with the BCBS Basel III regular monitoring exercise, the report also provides an update on the progress of the European banks in converging towards the new capital requirements.

The present report also presents the evolution of the CET1, Tier 1 and additional Tier 1 minimum required capital impact and the associated capital shortfalls[3]. The report shows how these values evolved over the period during which the EBA collected data with comparable breakdown of risk categories (e.g. credit risk split into SA and IRB approach), for a sample of banks that consistently submitted data from over the same period (constant sample).

The baseline impact assessment methodology quantifies the differences in the Pillar 1 minimum required capital between the current European Union (EU) implementation of the Basel standards (CRR/CRD IV) and the full Basel III implementation.

The cumulative impact analysis of the present report uses a sample of 105 banks, split between 42 Group 1 banks and 63 Group 2 banks[4,5]. The weighted average change in total T1 MRC after a full implementation of the reform is 16.1% ('reduced estimation bias') across all 105 banks, 17.3% for the large and internationally active banks (Group 1) and 8.1% for the other banks (Group 2) (see Table 1). The impact of the individual risk-based reforms across the entire sample is 20.2%. Output floor and operational risk are the two major drivers of MRC increases across the group of all banks, accounting for 6.5% and 5.0%, respectively. For Group 1 banks, the output floor and the operational risk are the major drivers, accounting for 6.8% and 5.5%, respectively. The same applies

[1] See Group of Governors and Heads of Supervision, *Governors and Heads of Supervision announce deferral of Basel III implementation to increase operational capacity of banks and supervisors to respond to Covid-19*, 27 March 2020, www.bis.org/press/p200327.htm.

[2] BCBS (2019), *Explanatory note on the minimum capital for market risk*.

[3] The shortfalls are presented as the evolution of an index with a basis of 100 in December 2017.

[4] Group 1 banks are banks that have Tier 1 capital in excess of EUR 3 billion and are internationally active. All other banks are labelled as Group 2 banks.

[5] Only the banks that submitted data for at least one of credit risk components (IRB approach or SA), operational risk and leverage ratio were included in the sample of the cumulative analysis. If these banks did not submit data for any of the remaining components of the exercise, i.e. market risk and CVA, the cumulative analysis assumed that there is no impact arising from the revisions to those components.

even to the global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs), with an impact of 6.7% for output floor and 6.3% for operational risk. The major driver for the impact on Group 2 banks is the credit risk, with an impact of 7.9%, followed by the output floor, with an impact of 4.1%.

Table 1, Table 2, Table 5, and Table 6 discriminate between 'reduced estimation bias' results and 'conservative estimation' results. The reason behind this discrimination is the submission of overly conservative data for market risk by two G-SIIs. To reduce the reported bias, the baseline scenario analysis sets the market risk impact for the two G-SIIs in question equal to zero. The 'conservative estimation' results are based on the originally reported, but overly conservative, market risk data.

The difference in the market risk impact between the 'reduced estimation bias' and 'conservative estimation' is 1.1% and the corresponding difference in the total impact on Tier 1 MRC is 0.9% (16.1% versus 17%). The two G-SIIs applied a sequence of conservative assumptions, namely the treatment of all trading book positions in equity investment in funds, that may no longer be allowed to be modelled, using the most conservative standardised approach, i.e. the 'other bucket' treatment, subject to the highest applicable risk weights. This implies that they are unable to use other treatments, such as the index treatment or the mandate-based approach as set out in MAR21.36[6], which are easy to apply given their sophistication.

For the full sample, the risk-based impact is offset (–4.1%) by the leverage ratio impact. This offset reflects the fact that some banks that are constrained by the leverage ratio in the current framework, will be less constrained by the leverage ratio in the revised framework. In the revised framework, the high impact on the risk-based requirements means that the leverage ratio add-on requirement is lower than the current add-on, resulting in the leverage ratio requirement being less constraining for the banks on average. Specifically, 44 banks are constrained by the leverage ratio requirement under the CRR/CRD IV, which represent 37.3% of the total RWA sample; under the final Basel III framework, only 12 banks remain constrained, which represent 8.9% of the total RWA[7]. Nevertheless, the contribution of the leverage ratio is overestimated as Pillar 2 requirements, O-SIIs capital requirement and countercyclical capital buffers are disregarded.

The offset from the leverage ratio is more important for Group 2 banks (–7.7%). For G-SIIs, there is no offset by the leverage ratio requirement because of the inclusion of the G-SIIs surcharge in the calculation of the final Basel III leverage ratio requirements for this group of institutions.

[6] See BCBS (2019), *MAR – Calculation of RWA for market risk/MAR21 – Standardised approach: sensitivities-based method*, https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/chapter/MAR/21.htm?inforce=20220101.

[7] See section 10.1.6 in the annex for more details on the interpretation of the impact of the leverage ratio.

Table 1: Change in total T1 MRC, as a percentage of the overall current Tier 1 MRC, due to the full implementation of Basel III (2028) (weighted averages, in %)

Part 1: Reduced estimation bias

Bank group	Credit risk				Market risk[8]	CVA	OpRisk	Output floor	Other Pillar 1	Total risk-based	Revised LR	Total
	SA	IRB	Securitisation	CCPs								
All banks	1.8	1.8	0.4	0.0	0.5	4.3	5.0	6.5	0.0	20.2	–4.1	16.1
Group 1	1.5	1.5	0.4	0.0	0.6	4.6	5.5	6.8	0.0	20.8	–3.5	17.3
Of which: G-SIIs	1.7	1.7	0.6	0.0	0.8	4.7	6.3	6.7	0.0	22.4	0.3	22.7
Group 2	4.0	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.4	2.3	1.4	4.1	0.0	15.9	–7.7	8.1

Part 2: Conservative estimation

Bank group	Credit risk				Market risk	CVA	Op Risk	Output floor	Other Pillar 1	Total risk-based	Revised LR	Total
	SA	RB	Securitisation	CCPs								
All banks	1.8	1.8	0.4	0.0	1.6	4.3	5.0	6.5	0.0	21.2	–4.2	17.0
Group 1	1.5	1.5	0.4	0.0	1.7	4.6	5.5	6.8	0.0	22.0	–3.7	18.3
Of which: G-SIIs	1.7	1.7	0.6	0.0	2.7	4.7	6.3	6.7	0.0	24.3	0.1	24.4
Group 2	4.0	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.4	2.3	1.4	4.1	0.0	15.9	–7.7	8.1

Source: EBA Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

Based on the constant sample of 97 banks that consistently submitted data from June 2018 to June 2019, and applying the latest methodology (as of June 2019), results are similar. The impact on total Tier 1 MRC shows minor variations across time (16.7% in June 2018, 17.3% in December 2018 and 16.6% in June 2019). The reporting of less granular data in the June 2018 exercise necessitated the estimation of the impact after making some operational assumptions for the estimation of several missing data. If we include, where available, data for the two banks that reported overly conservative market risk numbers, there is a 17.5% increase in the Tier 1 MRC in June 2019, compared with an 18.8% increase in December 2018.

Compared with the current fully phased-in CRR/CRD IV rules, under Basel III full implementation, the Tier 1 capital shortfall increases for all banks, but particularly for G-SIIs (Table 2). All types of capital shortfalls in this report are computed vis-à-vis Pillar 1 capital requirements only. The total shortfall due to the implementation of the final Basel III minimum Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1)-

[8] For two G-SIBs that are outliers owing to overly conservative assumptions under the revised market risk framework, zero change from the revised market risk framework has been assumed for the calculation of 30 June 2019 results showing 'reduced estimation bias'.

required capital is EUR 11.2 billion (of which EUR 8.1 billion is attributed to G-SIIs). The Tier 1 capital shortfall due to the risk-based capital requirements is approximately EUR 21.1 billion, while there is no additional Tier 1 shortfall from the implementation of the revised LR framework (in addition to the risk-based capital requirements). However, if the two G-SIBs that reported overly conservative market risk numbers are included, the shortfall would increase to EUR 25 billion in June 2019.

Table 2: Shortfall of current available capital due to the full implementation of CRR/CRD IV and Basel III (2028) (EUR billion)

Part 1: Reduced estimation bias

Bank group	Capital shortfalls — CRR/CRD IV (fully phased in)			Capital shortfalls — Basel III framework (2028)		
	CET1	Risk-based Tier 1	Additional LR Tier 1	CET1	Risk-based Tier 1	Additional LR Tier 1
All banks	0.2	0.8	1.7	11.2	21.1	0.0
Group 1	0.2	0.8	0.9	9.2	18.3	0.0
Of which: G-SIIs	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.1	16.4	0.0
Group 2	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.9	2.8	0.0

Part 2: Conservative estimation

Bank group	Capital shortfalls — CRR/CRD IV (fully phased in)			Capital shortfalls — Basel III framework (2028)		
	CET1	Risk-based Tier 1	Additional LR Tier 1	CET1	Risk-based Tier 1	Additional LR Tier 1
All banks	0.2	0.8	1.7	11.2	25.0	0.0
Group 1	0.2	0.8	0.9	9.2	22.1	0.0
Of which: G-SIIs	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.1	20.2	0.0
Group 2	0.0	0.0	0.8	1.9	2.8	0.0

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

When considering the entire sample of banks, the risk-based capital ratios, namely the CET1, T1 and total capital ratios, decline by 260, 290 and 330 basis points, respectively, following the implementation of the reform (Table 3). On average, the leverage ratio remains stable under the current (CRR/CRD IV) and revised (final Basel III) frameworks (5.1%) when the entire sample is considered. The decline in risk-based ratios is generally larger for Group 1 banks than for Group 2 banks.

Table 3: Capital ratios: fully phased-in CRR/CRD IV and final Basel III framework (2028) (weighted averages, in %), reduced estimation bias

Bank group	Capital ratios — CRR/CRD IV (fully phased in)				Capital ratios — Basel III framework (2028)			
	CET1	Tier 1	Total capital	LR	CET1	Tier 1	Total capital	LR
All banks	14.2	15.5	18.1	5.1	11.6	12.7	14.8	5.1
Group 1	14.0	15.5	18.1	5.0	11.4	12.6	14.7	5.0
Of which: G-SIIs	13.3	14.9	17.4	4.7	10.8	12.1	14.1	4.7
Group 2	15.4	16.0	18.1	5.5	12.9	13.4	15.2	5.4

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

Net stable funding ratio (NSFR) impact

In addition to the estimation of the impact of the implementation of the Basel III reforms, as finalised in December 2017, the current monitoring exercise report also assesses the impact of implementing the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) framework. The results show that in June 2019, EEA banks required additional stable funding of EUR 33.7 billion to fulfil the minimum NSFR

requirement of 100% (see Table 166). Compared with the December 2018 exercise, the shortfall of stable funding increased by EUR 19.5 billion. The vast majority of this increase is attributed to Group 1 banks (EUR 18.6 billion).

Taking a longer-term perspective, for the constant sample of banks over time, it can be observed that the compliance with the NSFR has steadily improved since the start of the monitoring exercise in June 2011. This is reflected in the reduction in the banks' shortfall of stable funding, i.e. the type of funding that counts for the minimum requirement. Indeed, between June 2011 and June 2019 this shortfall, for the consistent sample, decreased by 99.3% (from EUR 1138 billion to EUR 8 billion) for Group 1 banks and by 100% (from EUR 155 billion to EUR 0 billion) for Group 2 banks, based on constant samples.

1. Introduction

This report presents the estimated impact of the Basel III reform package on European banks as agreed in December 2017 by the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision. The assessment of the final package includes the revisions to the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach[9], the standardised approach to credit risk (SA)[10] and the standardised approach to operational risk[11], as well as the revisions to the Basel III leverage ratio framework[12], securitisation[13] and counterparty credit risk frameworks[14]. In addition, it includes the impact of the fundamental review of the trading book (FRTB)[15] agreed in 2019 and the credit valuation adjustment (CVA) and the introduction of the output floor.

1.1 Data and sampling

The data submitted for the cumulative impact assessment, as of June 2019, cover a total of 119 banks from 19 European Economic Area countries, comprising 44 Group 1 and 75 Group 2 banks. Only banks that submitted data for (a) at least one of the credit risk components (IRB or SA), (b) the operational risk and (c) the leverage ratio (LR) were included in the sample for the cumulative analysis. Based on these criteria and following data cleansing, 105 banks were finally included in the cumulative results of the point-in-time analysis for June 2019: 42 Group 1 banks and 63 Group 2 banks (see Table 4).

The subsamples used for analysing the impact of Basel III revisions on individual risk categories are larger than the sample used for the overall cumulative analysis (see shaded column in Table 4). As a result, the impact relating to credit risk, operational risk and market risk presented in certain parts of individual sections of the report may differ from those reported in the overall cumulative analysis.

[9] See BCBS (2016), *Reducing variation in credit risk-weighted assets: Constraints on the use of internal model approaches, March 2016*; BCBS (2017), *Finalising Basel III: An overview of post-crisis reforms*; BCBS (2017), *Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms;* BCBS (2019), *Explanatory note on the minimum capital for market risk.*

[10] See BCBS (2015), *Second consultative document: Standards — revisions to the Standardised Approach for credit risk*; BCBS (2017), *Finalising Basel III: An overview of post-crisis reforms*; BCBS (2017), *Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms.*

[11] See BCBS (2016), *Standardised measurement approach for operational risk: Consultative document*; BCBS (2017), *Finalising Basel III: An overview of post-crisis reforms*; BCBS (2017), *Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms.*

[12] See BCBS (2016), *Revisions to the Basel III leverage ratio framework: Consultative document.*

[13] See BCBS (2016), *Basel III document: Revisions to the securitisation framework, amended to include the alternative capital treatment for 'simple, transparent and comparable' securitisations*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d374.htm; BCBS and Board of the International Organization of Securities Commissions (2015), *Criteria for identifying simple, transparent and comparable securitisations*, www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d332.htm.

[14] See BCBS (2019), *Calculation of RWA for credit risk (CRE)*, https://www.bis.org/basel_framework/standard/CRE.htm.

[15] See BCBS (2016), *Minimum capital requirements for market risk: Standards*; BCBS (2019), *Explanatory note on the minimum capital for market risk.*

Table 4: Number of banks included in the cumulative analysis, per country

	Included	Included					
Country	**Cumulative analysis of the impact on MRC**	Credit risk	Market risk	CVA	OpRisk	LR	NSFR
AT	5	5	1	3	5	5	3
BE	3	3	2	3	3	3	3
DE	22	23	2	13	25	25	25
DK	4	4	2	4	4	4	3
ES	6	6	3	6	6	6	6
FI	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
FR	7	7	3	6	7	7	7
GB	8	8	5	8	8	8	6
GR	3	3	3	2	4	3	4
HU	1	1	0	0	1	1	1
IE	7	7	2	5	8	8	8
IT	11	11	7	8	13	13	13
LU	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
MT	1	1	0	1	1	1	1
NL	8	8	1	8	8	8	8
NO	1	2	1	2	2	1	2
PL	5	5	0	2	5	5	5
PT	4	4	1	1	4	4	3
SE	6	6	3	5	6	6	6
All banks	105	107	38	80	113	111	107
Group 1	42	42	21	39	44	43	42
Of which: G-SIIs	11	11	8	11	11	11	10
Group 2	63	65	17	41	69	68	65

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019).

1.2 Methodology for impact estimation

General methodological remarks

- **The methodology predominantly assesses the impact in terms of Pillar 1 Tier 1 minimum required capital (T1 MRC).** The T1 MRC in this report includes the capital conservation buffer (CCB) and the capital buffer for global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs), where applicable. It does not incorporate any Pillar 2 requirements nor does it consider any higher loss absorbency requirements for other (domestic) systemically important institutions (O-SIIs) and countercyclical capital buffer requirements. This methodology is in line with the approach followed by the BCBS Basel III quantitative impact study for the global banking system. For details on the methodology, see the annex.
- **The Pillar 1 Tier 1 minimum required capital (T1 MRC) includes both risk-based capital requirements and leverage ratio capital requirement.** The methodology assumes compliance with the higher of the risk-based capital requirements (i.e. those based on risk-weighted assets, including the effect of the output floor) and the leverage ratio requirement, under the Capital

Requirements Regulation (CRR)/Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV and Basel III frameworks (both fully phased in).

- **The impact on T1 MRC is the ratio of the difference between the Basel III and the CRR/CRD IV Pillar 1 T1 MRC to the CRR/CRD IV Pillar 1 T1 MRC.**
- **The impact assessment assumes a static balance sheet approach**, i.e. it does not consider any scheduled measures that banks might undertake to comply with the revised framework between June 2019 and the Basel III full implementation date.
- **The impact assessment methodology disentangles, where data allow, the impact of the IFRS 9 from the pure impact of the Basel III package.**
- **The estimated results are weighted averages, unless stated otherwise.**
- **The June 2019 and December 2018 monitoring exercise reports assess the impact of the January 2019 FRTB framework, while the June 2018 reports assess the impact of the January 2016 FRTB framework.**
- **The sample of the point-in-time analysis (June 2019 reference date only) consists of 105 banks while the sample of the time series analysis (June 2018, December 2018, June 2019) consists of 97 banks, to allow comparisons over time of a constant sample.**
- **Where applicable in the report, the estimation of the Tier 1 MRC impact that feeds the time series analyses assumes the application of the most recent rules retroactively, where the granularity and quality of past data allow.**
- **The 'reduced estimation bias' sets the market risk impact to zero for those banks that apply overly conservative approaches, given their sophistication, for the estimation FRTB capital requirements; the 'conservative estimation' uses the originally submitted, but overly conservative, data. The analysis lists both sets of results to provide the reader with an approximation of the difference between the two alternatives.**

1.2.1 Minimum required capital and differences with respect to methodology used by the BCBS

The report presents the impact of the reforms in terms of changes in Tier 1 minimum required capital (T1 MRC), comparing the fully implemented revised Basel III requirements with the current fully phased-in Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)/Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV requirements. The definition of the current Tier 1 MRC is the higher of the current risk-based T1 MRC and current LR-based Tier 1 MRC, while the Tier 1 MRC under Basel III reform scenario is the higher of the revised risk-based Tier 1 MRC and the revised LR-based Tier 1 MRC. The MRC measure has the advantages that it is common across all jurisdictions, it allows the simultaneous consideration of risk-based measures and the leverage ratio and it is not affected by Pillar 2 capital requirements, which may vary across EEA countries and may not be stable over time. Where explicitly indicated, the report provides evidence of the impact on other metrics, such as capital shortfalls of the current actual capital (Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1), T1, total capital) vis-à-vis the CRR/CRD IV MRC metric and final Basel MRC metric.

The current risk-weighted assets (RWA), which are the basis for the calculation of risk-based T1 MRC, do not include the RWA add-on based on the 'Basel I floor' [16], which was applied by some EU jurisdictions, because it ceased to exist in the EU as of 1 January 2018. As to the revised framework, the exercise assumes full implementation (as of 2028) of the output floor calibrated at 72.5% of the standardised approach RWA of the revised framework, while the estimation of the LR-based Tier 1 MRC consists of the existing minimum requirement (3%) plus 50% of the risk-based G-SIIs surcharge[17], where applicable[18]. The results shown in the report are weighted averages, unless stated otherwise.

1.2.2 Description of impact metrics

The following variables are used in the analysis for assessing the cumulative impact, in terms of T1 MRC:

- 'Total' shows the overall impact on T1 MRC, when moving from the current to the revised framework and after considering that banks must meet the higher of the risk-based capital requirements (i.e. including the 72.5% output floor) and the revised Basel III LR requirement with respect to T1 capital.
- 'Total risk-based' shows the impact on the risk-based T1 MRC, i.e. without including the impact of the revisions in the revised Basel LR T1 MRC.
- 'Credit risk' shows the impact on T1 MRC assigned to the revisions of the SA and IRB approach for credit risk, as well as the changes arising from the revisions in the securitisation, CCPs and standardised approach for counterparty credit risk.
- 'Market risk' shows the impact on T1 MRC assigned to the revisions to the SA and internal model approach (IMA) for market risk (FRTB).
- 'CVA' shows the impact on T1 MRC due to the revisions to the CVA framework, including the removal of the CVA exemptions under Article 382 of the CRR.
- 'Operational risk' shows the impact on T1 MRC due to the introduction of the new standardised measurement approach (SMA), assuming that the EU will not exercise any of the discretions allowed under the revised framework.
- 'Other P1 RWA' shows the impact on T1 MRC assigned to the revisions from the Basel III framework, which directly or indirectly affect the level of Other Pillar 1 RWA
- 'Output floor' presents the impact on the level of T1 MRC due to the application of the aggregate output floor on the total RWA. The output floor impact is the difference between 72.5% of the total SA-equivalent RWA and the model-based RWA.
- 'Revised LR' shows the impact on LR-based T1 MRC add-ons (i.e. the additional MRC on top of the risk-based MRC) assigned to the implementation of the revised LR framework. A positive change

[16] The impact is measured without considering the current national implementation of the Basel I-based transitional floors set out in the Basel II framework. The transitional Basel I-based floor was implemented in Article 500 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 (CRR) as a floor to actual own funds rather than a floor to RWAs. The temporary requirement expired on 31 December 2017.

[17] For example, for a bank with a G-SIIs buffer of 1%, the minimum LR T1 MRC would be 3.5% of the total exposure measure.

[18] See also BCBS (2013), *Global systemically important banks: Updated assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement*; Financial Stability Board (November 2018), *2018 list of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)*, http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/P161118-1.pdf.

shows that the LR requirement[19] becomes more constraining relative to RWA under the new framework, i.e. the final Basel III LR framework increases the T1 capital add-on in relation to the CRR/CRD IV add-on. A negative change shows that the final Basel III LR T1 add-on becomes less constraining than the CRR/CRD IV add-on, i.e. the final Basel III LR T1 add-on is lower than the CRR-CRD IV add-on.

In addition, the impact of the final Basel III framework is assessed in terms of 'capital shortfall' of the actual CET1, T1 and total capital, in relation to the MRC for CET1, T1 and total capital of the new framework, as follows:

- 'Capital shortfall' is estimated as the difference between the fully implemented MRC metric and the current actual capital set aside by the EEA banks. Bearing in mind that the current actual capital (CET1, T1, total capital) also covers Pillar 2 capital requirements, as well as EU-specific macroprudential buffers imposed by the relevant supervisor, the estimated shortfall should, in most cases, be an underestimation of the actual shortfall[20].

1.3 Distribution metrics

Some charts show box plots that give an indication of the distribution of the results among the participating banks. Those box plots are defined as follows:



[19] Currently, leverage ratio requirements are not yet binding in the EU; the proposed CRR II/CRD V will render the leverage ratio requirements binding.

[20] In the Basel III Call for Advice report, all the requirements are taken into account and the shortfalls are consequently considerably higher.

[21] To calculate the upper and lower fences, 1.5 times the IQR is added to the 75 th percentile and deducted from the 25th percentile.

2. Regulatory capital ratios, capital shortfalls and impact on T1 MRC

This section presents several metrics to assess the impact of the full implementation of the Basel III reform package. These metrics are the level of risk-based and LR-based capital, the capital shortfalls (section 2.1), the impact per risk category (section 2.2) and the interaction between the output floor, applied to the risk-based metrics, and the new leverage ratio framework (section 2.3).

2.1 Cumulative impact analysis of the final Basel III reform: point-in-time analysis (June 2019 only)

The analysis in the present section focuses on the impact of the Basel III package on the fully phased-in CRR/CRD IV T1 MRC. As mentioned previously, the advantage of the MRC measure is that it is common across all jurisdictions and is not affected by Pillar 2 capital requirements, which may vary across EEA countries and may not be stable over time.

Figure1: Distribution of changes in total T1 MRC, reduced estimation bias



Note: the mean value ('X') is the simple average. Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

Figure1: Distribution of changes in total T1 MRC **shows the distribution of changes of T1 MRC across all banks: Group 1 banks (large, internationally active banks), Group 2 banks (other banks) and G-SIIs.** Group 1 and Group 2 banks exhibit median values close to but below their respective averages. The dispersion of changes in T1 MRC, measured as the interquartile range, is wider for Group 1 banks than for Group 2 banks.

The weighted average increase in T1 MRC, after including the capital conservation buffer (CCB) and G-SIIs surcharge, is 16.5% across all 105 banks in the sample, 17.3% for Group 1 banks and 8.1% for Group 2 banks. Table 5 shows the impact of the Basel III reform assuming full implementation of the package. Table 5 presents the baseline estimation ('Reduced estimation bias') by setting the market risk impact for two G-SIIs equal to zero, because of the overly conservative assumptions for the reported market risk data, while the alternative estimation ('Conservative estimation') is based on the originally reported market risk data. Thus, the difference between the market risk impact of these two alternative estimations (1.1%) results in a difference in the total impact on the Tier 1 MRC of 0.9% (16.1% versus 17%).

For Group 1 banks, the overall increase in T1 MRC consists of a 20.8% increase in the risk-based components, mainly driven by the 6.8% increase due to output floor implementation, while the revised leverage ratio requirement offsets the risk-based T1 MRC by 3.5%. This offset reflects the fact that the revised Basel III LR becomes less constraining relative to RWA. For the G-SIIs, the LR requirement does not offset the risk-based MRC, mainly because of the introduction of the G-SIIs surcharge in the estimation of the LR requirement.

For Group 2 banks, the overall 8.1% increase in T1 MRC is driven by the 15.9% increase in the risk-based measure, mainly driven by an increase of 7.9% due to the credit risk revisions and an increase of 4.1% due to the output floor implementation. This increase is consistently offset by a 7.7% reduction in the leverage ratio impact (see section 10.1.6 in the annex for the detailed methodology).

Table 5: Changes in T1 MRC, per risk category, due to the implementation of the final Basel III framework (2028) (weighted averages, in %)

Part 1: Reduced estimation bias

Bank group	Credit risk				Market risk	CVA	Op Risk	Output floor	Other Pillar 1	Total risk-based	Revised LR	Total
	SA	IRB	Securitisation	CCPs								
All banks	1.8	1.8	0.4	0.0	0.5	4.3	5.0	6.5	0.0	20.2	–4.1	16.1
Group 1	1.5	1.5	0.4	0.0	0.6	4.6	5.5	6.8	0.0	20.8	–3.5	17.3
Of which: G-SIIs	1.7	1.7	0.6	0.0	0.8	4.7	6.3	6.7	0.0	22.4	0.3	22.7
Group 2	4.0	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.4	2.3	1.4	4.1	0.0	15.9	–7.7	8.1

Part 2: Conservative estimation

Bank group	Credit risk				Market risk	CVA	Op Risk	Output floor	Other Pillar 1	Total risk-based	Revised LR	Total
	SA	IRB	Securitisation	CCPs								
All banks	1.8	1.8	0.4	0.0	1.6	4.3	5.0	6.5	0.0	21.2	–4.2	17.0
Group 1	1.5	1.5	0.4	0.0	1.7	4.6	5.5	6.8	0.0	22.0	–3.7	18.3
Of which: G-SIIs	1.7	1.7	0.6	0.0	2.7	4.7	6.3	6.7	0.0	24.3	0.1	24.4

Bank group	Credit risk				Market risk	CVA	Op Risk	Output floor	Other Pillar 1	Total risk-based	Revised LR	Total
Group 2	4.0	3.9	0.0	0.0	0.4	2.3	1.4	4.1	0.0	15.9	–7.7	8.1

Source: EBA Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

When looking at the entire sample, the final Basel III CVA risk capital charge contributes 4.3% to the total impact when compared with the CRR/CRD IV framework. The significant CVA impact is primarily attributed to changes in the scope of the CVA risk capital charge, but also to the differences in the modelling of the current and the new standardised approaches. The significant CVA impact is primarily attributed to the removal of the European CVA exemptions for transactions with non-financial counterparties, sovereign counterparties, pension funds counterparties, client's transactions and intragroup transactions, as specified under Article 382 of the CRR.

2.2 Evolution of the cumulative impact analysis of the final Basel III reform (June 2018 to June 2019)

Based on the constant sample of banks (97 banks), i.e. those that consistently submitted data from June 2018 to June 2019, and after applying the latest methodology (June 2019) for assessing the impact of the Basel III reforms, the impact on the total Tier 1 MRC shows insignificant variations (see Table 6). The nature of the collected data did not allow the consistent application of methodologies for market risk. It is noteworthy that the exercise presents the results for market risk impact for the June 2018 results in accordance with the January 2016 FRTB framework and for the December 2018 and June 2019 results in accordance with the January 2019 FRTB framework. The market risk impact decreased from 1.6% in June 2018 to 0.8% in December 2018 and 0.6% in June 2019. The total credit risk impact increased from 3.8% in June 2018 to 5.1% in December 2018 before dropping to 4.3% in June 2019. Moreover, the methodology for estimating the impact for the constant sample required some additional operational assumptions to cope with the reporting of less granular or missing data in June 2018 exercise.

Table 6: Changes in T1 MRC, using the June 2019 methodology for all reference dates for a constant sample of banks, due to the implementation of the final Basel III framework (2028) (weighted averages, in %)

Part 1: Reduced estimation bias

Reference date	Credit risk	Market risk	CVA	OpRisk	Output floor	Other Pillar 1	Total risk-based	Revised LR	Total
30-Jun-18	3.8	1.6	4.5	4.9	7.0	-0.1	21.7	-5.0	16.7
31-Dec-18	5.1	0.8	4.0	5.4	5.9	-0.1	21.1	-3.7	17.3
30-Jun-19	4.3	0.6	4.3	5.1	6.3	-0.1	20.5	-3.9	16.6

Part 2: Conservative estimation

Reference date	Credit risk	Market risk	CVA	OpRisk	Output floor	Other Pillar 1	Total risk-based	Revised LR	Total
30-Jun-18	3.8	2.4	4.5	4.9	7.4	-0.1	22.8	-5.2	17.6
31-Dec-18	5.1	2.3	4.0	5.4	5.7	-0.1	22.5	-3.7	18.8
30-Jun-19	4.3	1.6	4.3	5.1	6.3	-0.1	21.5	-4.1	17.5

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 97 banks.

2.3 Capital ratios and capital shortfalls

This section presents the development of the capital ratios from the current to the full implementation framework, as well as the capital shortfalls that would arise from the full implementation of Basel III minimum capital requirements.

2.3.1 Capital ratios

Table 7 shows the results of the calculations for CET1, T1, the total capital ratios and the leverage ratio. In the case of the leverage ratio, the analysis assumes that the actual disposable capital, as at the reporting date, remains stable under the full implementation of CRR/CRD IV and under final Basel III. Thus, the source of changes in the leverage ratio, between the fully phased-in CRR/CRD IV and the final Basel III (2028), is entirely attributed to the changes in the definition of leverage ratio exposures.

Table 7: Comparison of risk-based capital ratios and leverage ratios under different states of implementation (weighted averages, in %), reduced estimation bias

Bank group	CET1			Tier 1			Total capital			Leverage ratio	
	Fully phased-in CRR/CRD IV	Transitional Basel III (2023)[22]	Final Basel III (2028)	Fully phased-in CRR/CRD IV	Transitional Basel III (2023)	Final Basel III (2028)	Fully phased-in CRR/CRD IV	Transitional Basel III (2023)	Final Basel III (2028)	Fully phased-in CRR/CRD IV	Final Basel III (2028)
All banks	14.2	12.3	11.6	15.5	13.5	12.7	18.1	15.7	14.8	5.1	5.1
Group 1	14.0	12.1	11.4	15.5	13.4	12.6	18.1	15.7	14.7	5.0	5.0
Of which: G-SIIs	13.3	11.4	10.8	14.9	12.8	12.1	17.4	14.9	14.1	4.7	4.7
Group 2	15.4	13.3	12.9	16.0	13.8	13.4	18.1	15.6	15.2	5.5	5.4

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

Figure 2: Distribution of capital ratios under fully phased-in CRR/CRD IV versus fully phased-in final Basel III framework



[22] The transitional implementation (2022) includes the impact of applying the transitional output floor rate of 50%; all other provisions of final Basel III are fully implemented.



Note: the mean value ('X') is the simple average. Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

The average impact on capital ratios is broadly similar across all bank categories. However, the dispersion across the different types of capital ratios is clearly wider for Group 2 banks both before and after the introduction of the reform (Figure 2). Looking at the impact of the reform on distributions, the dispersion of CET1 ratios remains almost unchanged, showing almost the same width between the current CRR/CRD IV and Basel III. On the other hand, the dispersion of Tier 1 and total capital ratios becomes narrower under the Basel III framework. The dispersion of LR remains almost unchanged.

2.3.2 Capital shortfalls

The capital shortfall compares the actual level of capital (CET1, Tier 1 and total capital) in June 2019 with the fully implemented MRC, after taking into account the CCB and G-SIIs surcharge, where applicable[23]. The capital shortfalls under the current fully phased-in CRR/CRD IV are negligible.

The combined, risk-based and leverage ratio requirements, Tier 1 capital shortfall that emerges under the full implementation of the Basel III is mainly driven by G-SIIs. The estimated Tier 1 capital shortfall is EUR 21.1 billion for all banks, EUR 18.3 billion for Group 1 banks, EUR 16.4 billion for the Group 1 subset of G-SIIs and EUR 2.8 billion for Group 2 banks (Table 8).

Table 8: Capital shortfalls by bank group under full implementation of CRR/CRD IV (upper part) and final Basel III (lower part) (EUR billion), reduced estimation bias

Full implementation of CRR/CRD IV

Bank group	CET1	Tier 1			Total capital	
		Risk-based[24]	Stand-alone LR-based	Risk-based and LR-based Tier 1[25]	Risk-based[26]	Risk-based total capital and LR-based Tier 1[27]

[24] 8.5% (= minimum Tier 1 (6%) + capital conservation buffer (2.5%)).

All banks	0.2	0.8	2.5	2.5	0.0	2.5
Group 1	0.2	0.8	1.7	1.7	0.0	1.7
Of which: G-SIIs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Group 2	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.0	0.8

Full implementation of Basel III

Bank group	CET1	Tier 1			Total capital	
		Risk-based	Stand-alone LR based	Risk-based and LR-based Tier 1	Risk-based	Risk-based total capital and LR-based Tier 1
All banks	11.2	21.1	2.8	21.1	23.0	24.5
Group 1	9.2	18.3	1.7	18.3	19.5	21.0
Of which: G-SIIs	8.1	16.4	0.0	16.4	19.3	19.3
Group 2	1.9	2.8	1.1	2.8	3.5	3.5

Note: upper part, full implementation of CRR/CRD IV; lower part, full implementation of final Basel III.
Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

The final Basel III revisions to the risk-based capital requirements result in a CET1 capital shortfall of EUR 11.2 billion. For Tier 1 risk-based requirements, this shortfall increases almost twofold, to EUR 21.1 billion. The stand-alone LR-based Tier 1 MRC is EUR 2.8 billion. However, the application of both risk-based and LR-based requirements does not increase the Tier 1 capital shortfall further to that indicated by the risk-based shortfall (EUR 21.1 billion).

2.3.3 Risk category participation in the risk-based Tier 1 MRC over time

Figure 3: Evolution of the composition of Tier 1 MRC by risk category under full implementation of the revised Basel III framework over time (from June 2018 to June 2019), for Group 1 and Group 2

Group 1



[24] 8.5% (= minimum Tier 1 (6%) + capital conservation buffer (2.5%)).

[25] The results presented in this column are estimated as follows: $\sum \max(LR\_based\_MRC - Risk\_based\_MRC, 0)$.

[26] Assuming compliance with the risk-based capital ratio requirements only.

[27] Assuming compliance with both the risk-based capital ratio and leverage ratio requirements.

Group 2



Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); constant sample: 97 banks.

Compared with the prior to December 2017 Basel III package (not shown), the implementation of the output floor introduces a new impact factor which, in effect, reduces the relative contributions of all other factors. Figure 3 shows the composition of MRC by risk category from June 2018 to June 2019.

2.4 Interactions between risk-based and leverage ratio capital requirements

This section focuses on analysing whether or not the Basel III framework renders the leverage ratio requirements more or less constraining than the CRR/CRD IV requirements. It is notable that the contribution of leverage ratio is overestimated because the Pillar 2 requirements, O-SIIs capital requirement and countercyclical capital buffers, which would increase risk-based requirements without impacting leverage ratio, are disregarded. Figure 4 presents the mechanics for the estimation of the leverage ratio impact. Details can be found in section 10.1.6 of the annex.

The aggregate Tier 1 MRC, consisting of the combined risk-based and LR-based requirements, increases from EUR 975.9 billion under CRR/CRD IV to EUR 1 133.4 billion under the final Basel III (an increase by 16.1% — see Table 1). The stand-alone risk-based MRC for all banks under the CRR/CRD IV is EUR 899.1 billion, while the stand-alone LR-based MRC is EUR 897.1 billion. The corresponding values under the final Basel III framework are EUR 1 096.3 billion and EUR 1001.6 billion. The total leverage ratio requirement add-on, estimated at the individual bank level, decreases from EUR 76.7 billion under CRR/CRD IV to EUR 37.1 billion under the final Basel III framework.

Figure 4: The mechanics of the calculation of actual leverage ratio MRC impact, Tier 1 MRC (EUR billion) and reduced estimation bias



Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

$\sum[\boldsymbol{Risk-based}\ (\boldsymbol{i=1,n})]$, *the aggregate risk-based Tier 1 MRC;*
$\sum[\boldsymbol{LR-based}\ (\boldsymbol{i=1,n})]$, *the aggregate leverage-ratio-based Tier 1 MRC;*
$\sum[\boldsymbol{max(Risk-based}\ (\boldsymbol{i=1,n}), \boldsymbol{LR-based}(\boldsymbol{i=1,n})]$, *the aggregate total Tier 1 MRC, which ensures compliance, at the individual bank level, with the higher of risk-based and LR requirements;*
$\sum[\boldsymbol{LR\ add-on}\ (\boldsymbol{i=1,n})]$, *the aggregate amount of leverage ratio add-ons, i.e. the sum of the differences where the LR-based Tier 1 MRC is higher than the risk-based Tier 1 MRC.*

The comparison between the CRR/CRD IV and the final Basel III frameworks therefore indicates that the leverage ratio requirement becomes less constraining under the final Basel III framework. This means that part of the additional MRC that was previously attributed to the LR will in the future be attributed to the risk-based Basel III MRC. In percentage terms, this change corresponds to the leverage ratio impact of –4.1% shown in Table 1 and Table 5.

3. Credit risk

This section assesses the impact of the Basel III reforms that is related to the revisions to the SA and the IRB approach for credit risk. The changes in the final framework aim, among other things, to increase comparability by aligning definitions and taxonomies between the SA and the IRB approach. In particular, the final reforms (1) introduce new asset classes, or split the existing asset classes, and (2) revise the eligibility and/or the scope of using the IRB approach for some asset classes[28]. Because of these changes, a direct comparison between the proposed and current frameworks is not possible. Therefore, the estimated impact is an approximation.

The analysis suffered from some data quality issues, arising mainly from difficulties in allocating portfolios in accordance with the revised categorisation of the asset classes as well as from different interpretations of the revised framework. The outcome of data cleansing showed that banks opted to be rather conservative when providing data for the revised framework, suggesting that the impact shown in this report could be an overestimation of the actual impact. The final Basel III framework allows jurisdictions to choose either the loan-splitting approach or the whole-loan approach for residential and commercial real estate. The current analysis assumes throughout that the loan-splitting approach is adopted[29].

Figure 5: Changes in Tier 1 MRC for credit risk (SA and IRB) exposures due to the final Basel III standards



Note: the mean value ('X') is the simple average. Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 107 banks.

The median impact over all portfolios, i.e. SA and IRB approach portfolios, that is attributed to credit risk only is approximately 3.9% as a percentage of the current Tier 1 MRC. Figure 5 shows the distribution of changes in Tier 1 MRC assigned to the revisions of the SA and the IRB approach for credit risk. The median impact is 1.6% for SA portfolios and 1.8% for IRB approach portfolios.

[28] For more information, please refer to https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.htm.

[29] Nevertheless, few banks reported data under the whole-loan approach.

When the overall impact is broken down into asset classes for the SA (not shown), the largest increase in RWA among the entire sample is attributed to 'equities', 'equity investment in funds' and 'subordinated debt and capital instruments other than equity' (+41.9%). The examination of Group 1 and Group 2 banks separately shows that the impact on RWA from the revisions in the abovementioned asset classes is 32.1% and 66.7%, respectively.

For equity exposures currently under the SA, the factor with the highest impact is the increase in the risk weight of 'other equity' from 100% in the current framework (with higher risk weights if specific conditions apply) to 250% in the revised framework within the 'other equity' sub-category. The newly created sub-categories 'speculative equity' (risk weight 400%) and 'equity under National Legislated Programmes' (risk weight 100%) jointly account for only a minor proportion of the EU equity portfolio under the SA (below 5% in terms of exposure amounts).

The removal of the IRB approach for exposures to 'equity', i.e. the migration to the SA, causes a decrease (–11.7%) in the RWA of this exposure class that is currently under the IRB. The risk weight for 'equity' exposures, currently under the IRB approach, is expected to drop to 250%, under the revised SA framework, from the current prevailing risk weight of 370%, under the simple risk weight approach.

4. FRTB

This section assesses the impact — ceteris paribus — of the January 2019[30] BCBS reforms related to the capital requirements for market risk. This report assesses the impact of the revised FRTB framework. As in other sections, data quality checks revealed some issues and limitations in the information submitted by banks and the findings should therefore be interpreted with caution. In particular, some outliers affect the summary results, pushing the average values beyond the median values across the majority of risk categories and bank groups. Note that although the reported figures include the impact of the outliers, they have been eliminated from the graphical presentation in Figure 6.

Figure 6: The change of market risk capital requirements after FRTB implementation, without floor, broken down by approach and bank group (in % of market risk MRC)

Part 1: Reduced estimation bias



Part 2: Conservative estimation



Note: the mean value ('X') is the simple average. Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); Part 1 sample: 38 banks, Part 2 sample: 40 banks.

[30] https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d457.htm.

Figure 6 shows the impact of the revised market risk standards on total MRC assigned to market risk. The average impact of the FRTB reform for all banks is 41.0% of current market risk MRC, with an interquartile range that spans from approximately –23.9% to 95%, thus masking significant heterogeneity across banks. The heterogeneity is similar for Group 1 banks but higher for G-SIIs and Group 2 banks.

With regard to the individual approaches to measuring market risk, the distribution of the impact, as represented by the interquartile range, is much wider under the standardised approach (SA) than under the internal model approach (IMA). For the standardised approach, the impact ranges from approximately 5.0% to 116%, with a weighted average impact of approximately 74.7%. The distribution of the impact due to the implementation of the IMA approach is roughly the same as the total market risk impact[31]. Figure 7 shows the proportion of market risk capital requirements that is attributable to the approaches under the current rules and under the revised standards.

For Group 1 banks, the key driver under the current rules is the IMA (65%), followed by the SA (33%), while other market risk capital requirements are negligible (2%). Under the revised rules, the proportion of minimum capital requirements calculated under IMA decreases to 56% while the SA proportion increases to 44%. In contrast, Group 2 banks currently have most of their minimum capital requirements computed under the SA (81%), with just 18% under the IMA. Under the revised rules, the SA makes up almost the entire minimum capital requirement (94%), with the IMA making up only 6%.

Figure 7: Contribution to the total market risk RWA by each calculation method before and after FRTB, reduced estimation bias



Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 38 banks.

[31] Many Group 2 banks migrate to SA under the revised standards, resulting in very few data points for the impact of IMA under this group.

5. Operational risk

As regards operational risk, the final Basel III framework replaces all existing approaches, including the model-driven advanced measurement approach (AMA), with a new approach, the standardised measurement approach (SMA). Under the new operational risk framework, banks can use only the SMA. Small banks will have to calculate the MRC based only on the business indicator component (BIC), while large banks will also have to calculate the loss component (LC).

According to Table 9, the revisions to the framework generate an aggregate increase in operational risk MRC of approximately 53.5% for Group 1 banks and 19.1% for Group 2 banks. The results show that, on average, Group 1 banks that are migrating from the AMA are less affected by the revisions than those Group 1 banks that are currently using other approaches. However, the average impact on Group 1 non-AMA banks is driven by a couple of outliers. The opposite development can be observed for Group 2 banks, with the AMA banks being affected more by the new framework than the non-AMA banks.

There are several reasons for the higher impact of operational risk on Group 1 than on Group 2. First, the main driver of the observed increase is the fact that some of the AMA banks currently have significantly lower MRC for operational risk (OpRisk) than banks that use the current indicator-based approaches. Second, Group 1 banks are mainly large banks with more complex and more fee-driven business models, whereas Group 2 banks tend to provide universal and diversified bank services that do not rely significantly on fees. For the fee-driven business models, the new indicator has been set at a more conservative level to address the higher operational risks that are generally observed for these kinds of business models. Third, large banks are generally affected by the high business indicator. Larger banks belonging to buckets 2 and 3 are also affected by the high marginal coefficients assigned to them (see section 0 in the annex).

Table 9: Changes in T1 MRC assigned to operational risk only (% of the MRC T1 assigned to operational risk under CRR/CRD IV)

Bank group	Migrating from AMA	Others	Total
All banks	39.2	60.2	49.9
Group 1	38.7	70.0	53.5
Of which: G-SIIs	40.8	74.6	55.9
Group 2	49.8	10.4	19.1

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 113 banks.

A deeper look into the data shows that the use of the AMA affects the proportion of operational risk in relation to the total risk. The dominant factor in the operational risk models is the past losses, which tend to drive the risk exposure and therefore the proportion of operational risk. The European AMA banks have experienced a wide variety of loss histories in the past 10 years. For example, some of them suffered high past losses due to crystallised conduct risk, which has significantly increased their MRC for the OpRisk category.

The analysis in Table 10 presents the relation between the level of past losses and the proportion of OpRisk MRC in the total capital for different types of AMA banks. Type 1 institutions comprise AMA banks with a low proportion of operational risk to total MRC and low past operational losses.

These banks show small capital increases owing to the dominant impact of the BIC-driven capital requirements. The low past operational risk losses reduce the loss component (LC) and, in turn, the internal loss multiplier (ILM), causing the capital requirements (= BIC × ILM) to be equal to or lower than the BIC alone would suggest (see section 0 in the annex). Similar capital impacts are also observed for type 2 AMA banks, which exhibit high proportions of operational risk and high past losses. However, the BIC of these banks dampens the capital increase triggered by the ILM. Type 3 AMA banks have a high proportion of operational risk and low past losses. This type of AMA bank tends not to benefit from capital relief because of a dampening effect of BIC and ILM values. Finally, type 4 AMA banks have a low proportion of operational risk and high past losses. This type of bank suffers significant capital increases because of the impact of an increase in both the BIC and the ILM values. The impact of an increase in BIC is purely due to the AMA migration to the standardised approach, which alone is sufficient to increase the MRC. The impact of an increase in ILM arises because high past operational risk losses increase the loss component (LC) and, in turn, the internal loss multiplier (ILM), causing the capital requirements (= BIC × ILM) to be even higher than the BIC alone would suggest.

Table 10: Capital impact attributed to certain types of AMA banks

Level of past losses	**Proportion of OpRisk MRC in total MRC**	
	Low	High
Low	Type 1 AMA (normal AMA): • BIC increasing impact • LC/ILM decreasing impact → most likely an increase in MRC due to the higher weight of BIC	Type 3 AMA (conservative AMA): • BIC decreasing impact • LC/ILM decreasing impact → significant reduction in MRC
High	Type 4 AMA (progressive AMA): • BIC increasing impact • LC/ILM increasing impact → significant increase in MRC	Type 2 AMA (normal AMA): • BIC decreasing impact • LC/ILM increasing impact → dependent on the level of past losses; slight reduction in MRC due to the higher weight of the BIC or slight increase due to extreme losses that even compensate for the dominant effect of the decreasing BIC

The findings in the operational risk section refer only to those banks in quantitative impact study (QIS) sample. The sample covers almost the entire population of large AMA banks, which face more significant capital increases than Group 2 banks, which use mainly simple approaches and are underrepresented in the sample. This may create a bias towards a higher overall/average impact. In addition, some of the banks currently have Pillar 2 capital add-ons because of weaknesses in their operational risk management, which are not considered in the current analysis. As a result, the total impact shown in Table 9 may be an overestimate.

The average change in the operational risk capital requirements for AMA banks is clearly higher than the corresponding value for banks that currently apply other methods. The differences

between AMA banks and other banks are more pronounced when comparing the 75th percentiles of the changes of the operational risk capital requirements (Figure 8).

Figure 8: Distribution of changes in T1 MRC assigned to operational risk only (in % of operational risk MRC)



Note: the mean value ('X') is the simple average. Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 113 banks.

The final Basel III framework provides supervisors with the discretion to set the past-losses threshold at EUR 100 000 and/or to set ILM = 1 for all banks in their jurisdictions. For the sake of comparability with the operational risk impact, which appears in the cumulative impact analysis (Table 1 and Table 5), the analysis below presents the alternative impact arising from the exercise of such jurisdictional discretions. To this end, the analysis compares (1) the operational risk capital requirements that arise from the actual calculation of the ILM with (2) the capital requirements that arise when the discretions to set the loss materiality threshold at EUR 100 000 for bucket 2 and 3 banks[32] and to set ILM = 1 for all banks are exercised.

Table 11: Comparison of operational impact on T1 MRC of the application of baseline Basel III full implementation, i.e. ILM with EUR 20 000 loss materiality threshold, the discretion to apply a loss materiality threshold of EUR 100 000 for the estimation of ILM (discretion 1) and the discretion to apply ILM = 1 (discretion 2) (in % of total Tier 1 MRC)

Bank group	Basel III baseline (loss materiality threshold: EUR 20 000)	Basel III discretion 1 (loss materiality threshold: EUR 100 000)	Basel III discretion 2 (ILM = 1)
All banks	5.0	4.6	1.3
Group 1	5.5	5.1	1.3
Of which: G-SIIs	6.3	5.9	1.2
Group 2	1.4	0.9	0.8

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019;, sample: 105 banks.

Table 11 includes an analysis of the impact on the T1 MRC for operational risk assigned to each jurisdictional discretion (ILM = 1 and actual ILM based on EUR 100 000 operational loss

[32] See BCBS (2017), *Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms*, page 131, para. 19(d): '… At national discretion, for the purpose of the calculation of average annual losses, supervisors may increase the threshold to € 100 000 for banks in buckets 2 and 3 (i.e. where the BI is greater than €1 bn).'

materiality threshold for banks with a business indicator (BI) > EUR 1 billion or the equivalent of BIC > EUR 120 million). Discretions 1 and 2 affect only banks with BI > EUR 1 billion. The impact is shown for the cumulative analysis sample (105 banks) to allow for comparisons between the baseline Basel III operational risk framework and the discretions applied.

6. Output floor

Table 12 shows how the gradual elevation of the output floor affects the MRC throughout the phase-in period. According to the provisions of the Basel III reform package, there will be a 5-year transitional period for the implementation of the output floor, according to which the level of the floor, i.e. the percentage of the non-modelled RWA, will gradually increase from 50% in 2023 to the fully phased-in level of 72.5% in 2028. The impact of the output floor on the MRC during the first 2 years of the phase-in period is negligible for Group 1 banks and for G-SIIs, while it has a small impact on MRC of the Group 2 banks (1.6%).

The analysis does not take into account the national discretion of applying a 25% cap during the transitional period. The final Basel III framework provides the national discretion of applying, during the transitional period, a cap on the incremental increase in output floor impact on total RWA. This transitional period cap is set at 25% of a bank's incremental increase in RWA[33]. Thus, the exercise of this discretion may limit the year-to-year incremental increase in the output floor impact to 25%[34]. The application of this discretion (not shown in Table 12) might reduce the impact in some of the years between 2023 and 2027.

Table 12: Cumulative output floor impact during the implementation phase (% of the total CRR/CRD IV Tier 1 MRC), reduced estimation bias

Bank group	2023 (50%)	2024 (55%)	2025 (60%)	2026 (65%)	2027 (70%)	2028 (72.5%)
All banks	0.1	0.3	1.0	2.5	4.6	6.5
Group 1	0.0	0.1	0.8	2.4	4.7	6.8
Of which: G-SIIs	0.0	0.1	0.9	2.6	4.5	6.7
Group 2	1.1	1.6	2.0	2.7	3.5	4.1

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

The highest increase in the output floor impact is observed for Group 1 banks in 2027, when the percentage of the output floor rate increases from 65% (2026) to 70% (2026) and the impact increases by approximately 210 basis points (from 2.5% to 4.6%). However, the highest sensitivity of MRC impact to the introduction of the output floor is observed for G-SIIs in 2028, when the impact increases by approximately 76 basis points for each percentage point increase in the output floor rate between 70% and 72.5%[35].

[33] See BCBS (2017), *Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms,* p. 139, paragraph 10: 'During the phase-in period, supervisors may exercise national discretion to cap the incremental increase in a bank's total RWAs that results from the application of the floor. This transitional cap will be set at 25% of a bank's RWAs before the application of the floor…'.

[34] For example, if the application of the output floor on total RWAs results in an impact of EUR 10 billion in 2023 (output floor rate = 55%) and EUR 15 billion in 2024 (output floor rate = 60%), the exercise of the discretion implies that the impact in 2024 may be capped at EUR 12.5 billion (= EUR 10 billion + EUR 10 billion × 25%).

[35] 190 basis points/2.5% = 76 basis points of impact per percentage point of output floor increase.

7. Revised leverage ratio

This section assesses the impact of the amendments to Basel III LR requirements[36]. Figure 9 compares the distributions of the leverage ratio levels according to the current fully phased-in definition with the final Basel III definition. Results in this section include all banks that submitted leverage ratio data that were of sufficiently good quality[37].

Considered in isolation from the other Basel III risk-based reforms (Table 13), the measure of the leverage ratio exposure decreases by 0.3% for all banks relative to the current framework. However, when the 50% of the G-SIIs surcharge is included, the overall increase in the LR Tier 1 MRC rises to 11.7%.

Table 13: Impact of LR, in isolation from the risk-based provisions, due to changes in the definition of leverage ratio exposures (LREs) and changes in the calculation (50% of G-SIIs surcharge) of the LR T1 MRC (%)

Bank group		Impact due to changes in the definition of LRE only	Impact due to the definition of LRE and inclusion of 50% of G-SIIs surcharge
All banks	100.0	–0.3	11.7
Group 1	100.0	–0.4	13.1
Of which: G-SIIs	100.0	–0.3	21.2
Group 2	100.0	0.7	1.0

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

The implementation of the final Basel reforms will imply only negligible changes in the average LR for all bank categories considered. The comparison of leverage ratio levels between the current and revised frameworks (Figure 9) shows little change in the average and median values, or in the distribution of the LR. Approximately 46.6% of the banks showed an increase in the leverage ratio exposure due to the implementation of the 2017 revisions, while approximately 49.5% showed a decrease in the LR exposure.

In terms of Tier 1 MRC, the impact becomes more prominent when the analysis includes both the changes in the definition of leverage ratio exposure and the implementation of the additional 50% of the G-SIIs surcharge. The G-SII surcharge affects the averages only of the categories Group 1 and 'all banks'. Group 2 banks are not subject to the G-SIIs surcharge and, therefore, the average impact of the LR revisions is solely due to changes in the definition of LR exposure.

[36] The amendments to the current Basel III LR exposure measure, agreed by the BCBS and expected to have the more visible impact, are the following: implementation of a specific treatment of pending settlement transactions; clarification on cash-pooling transactions; reduction in specific and general provisions as well as prudential valuation adjustments from the Basel III LR exposure measure; replacement of the current exposure method by a modified version of the SA to counterparty credit risk for measuring derivative exposures; clarification on the treatment of credit derivatives and derivative-clearing services within a multi-level client structure; incorporation of identical credit conversion factors to off-balance-sheet items, as for the SA for credit risk; and introduction of an add-on buffer to the minimum LR requirement, calibrated at 50% of the current G-SIIs buffer in the risk-weighted surcharge ratio.

[37] Table 3 and Table 6 provide LR levels for a sample of 105 banks that are included in the cumulative impact analysis.

Figure 9: Comparison of fully phased-in EU LR and final Basel III LR



Note: the mean value ('X') is the simple average. Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019; sample: 105 banks.

Figure 10: Drivers of change in leverage ratio exposure in the final Basel III standards, in % of the current total LR-based T1 MRC



Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

The main driver of the total change in the leverage ratio exposure values is the increase in 'OBS' (0.8%). For Group 1 banks (42 banks) and its subsample of G-SIIs (11 banks), the change in 'OBS' is the same (0.7% and 0.7%, respectively). For the Group 2 sample (63 banks), the main driver for the increase in the total leverage ratio exposure is the 'off-balance-sheet exposures' (0.8%) together with the 'derivatives' (0.8%). Figure 10 shows the impact of the changes in the definition of final Basel III standards on the main components of the leverage ratio exposure.

8. Interaction between output floor and leverage ratio requirements

Following the Basel III provisions, the analysis in the current report assumes that the leverage ratio requirements act as a backstop to the risk-based requirements and thus are applicable after the risk-based requirements, including the output floor. According to this methodology, the output floor creates an additional capital requirement under the Basel III framework, which smooths out the impact of the LR add-on on the risk-based requirements. This offset of the LR impact is obvious when examining the stand-alone increase in the leverage ratio capital requirements (11.7%), vis-à-vis the relative LR impact after taking into account the risk-based capital requirements, including the output floor (–4.1%).

This chapter aims to calculate the stand-alone impact of the output floor on MRC by assuming that all other requirements, including the LR, are applied before the output floor. The order of the application of the various requirements does not change the final impact on MRC, but it allows the isolation of the impact of the last requirement that is applied. In the case of the output floor, this takes into account the fact that some of the increase in MRC attributed to the output floor in the cumulative analysis of the present report (Table 1 and Table 5) is, in fact, already required by the LR, but in the final Basel III regime it is 'taken on' by the output floor because it is applied before the LR. Therefore, this approach underestimates the stand-alone impact of the LR (indeed, it shows a decrease in MRC) and overestimates the stand-alone impact of the output floor.

To illustrate the case, three scenarios are calculated:

- *Baseline scenario*: application of leverage ratio requirement after applying the output floor requirement, as part of the risk-based requirements (final Basel III regime);
- *Scenario 1*: application of the leverage ratio requirement alone, i.e. without applying the output floor;
- *Scenario 2*: application of the output floor requirement after applying the leverage ratio requirement, i.e. reversed order of application.

Scenario 1 assumes that the output floor is equal to 0%. Scenario 2 is calculated as the difference between the baseline scenario (presented in the cumulative results), where the output floor is set to 72.5%, and Scenario 1.

Note that, in the interaction between leverage ratio and output floor, the impact of the leverage ratio is overestimated because Pillar 2 requirements, O-SIIs capital requirements and countercyclical capital buffers are disregarded.

The results in Table 14 show the number of constrained banks under the two scenarios, as well as the difference attributed to the output floor.

Table 14: Number of banks constrained by the risk-based capital requirement, with and without the implementation of the output floor

Scenarios	Number of banks constrained by the risk-based requirements	Number of banks constrained by output floor	Number of banks constrained by leverage ratio
Risk-based capital requirements without the output floor (scenario 1)	75	–	30
Risk-based capital requirements with the output floor (baseline scenario)	75	18	12

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

Under the baseline scenario, 71.4% of the banks in the sample are constrained by the risk-based requirements, before applying the output floor, 17.1% is constrained by the output floor and 11.4% is constrained by the leverage ratio requirement (see Table 14). The implementation of Basel III risk-based requirements, without the output floor, and the leverage ratio requirements results in 75 banks being constrained by the risk-based requirements and 30 banks by the leverage ratio (see Table 14). The implementation of the output floor, as part of the risk-based requirements, results in 18 banks being constrained by the risk-based requirements after including the output floor.

The impacts of the LR and output floor are (a) under the baseline scenario EUR –39.6 billion and EUR 63.4 billion, respectively; (b) under Scenario 1 EUR –7.4 billion and zero, respectively; and (c) under Scenario 2 EUR –7.4 billion and EUR 31.1 billion, respectively (see also Table 15 and Figure 11). The negative leverage ratio impact implies a reduction in the add-on of leverage ratio from the current CRR/CRD IV regime because the add-on is reduced by EUR 39.6 billion, from EUR 76.7 billion to EUR 37.1 billion, owing to the increase of RWA. This translates into a –4.1% LR impact (see also Table 1) compared with the current Tier 1 MRC (–39.6/975.9).

Under Scenarios 1 and 2, the leverage ratio add-on is EUR –7.4 billion, which implies an overall impact of the LR on MRC of –0.8%. Scenario 2 then applies the output floor as the last requirement in the sequence (no output floor is applied under Scenario 2). In this case, the Tier 1 MRC add-on due to the output floor is 3.2%, which is significantly lower than the 6.5% add-on under the baseline scenario. This implies that the isolated impact of the output floor alone, as a new element of the framework, contributes to an increase in MRC of EUR 31.1 billion (or 3.5% increase).

Table 15: Actual impact (baseline) and implied impact (Scenario 1 and Scenario 2) on Tier 1 MRC from the implementation of risk-based capital requirements, implementing the output floor before and after the LR implementation, based on reduced estimation bias for risk-based Tier 1 MRC

Scenarios	Risk-based (without output floor) Tier 1 MRC in EUR billion (implied impact in %)	Output floor (before LR) Tier 1 MRC in EUR billion (implied impact in %)	Leverage ratio Tier 1 MRC in EUR billion	Leverage ratio add-on in EUR billion (implied impact in %)	Output floor **(after LR)** Tier 1 MRC in EUR billion (implied impact in %)	Total implied impact (%)
Baseline: with output floor (before LR)	1 032.9 (13.7)	63.4 (6.5)	1 001.6	-39.6 (-4.1)	Not applicable	16.1
	1 032.9	Not Applicable	1 001.6	-7.4	Not applicable	13.0

Scenarios	Risk-based (without output floor) Tier 1 MRC in EUR billion (implied impact in %)	Output floor (before LR) Tier 1 MRC in EUR billion (implied impact in %)	Leverage ratio Tier 1 MRC in EUR billion	Leverage ratio add-on in EUR billion (implied impact in %)	Output floor **(after LR)** Tier 1 MRC in EUR billion (implied impact in %)	Total implied impact (%)
Scenario 1: without output floor	(13.7)			(-0.8)		
Scenario 2: with output floor (after LR)	1 032.9 (13.7)	Not applicable	1 001.6	-7.4 (-0.8)	31.1 (3.2)	16.1

Note: The 'leverage ratio implied impact' for the baseline scenario is –4.1% (also shown in Table 1 and Table 5 as 'LR impact') and is calculated as EUR –39.6 billion (EUR 37.1 billion – EUR 76.7 billion) / EUR 975.9. EUR 76.7 billion is the CRR/CRD IV leverage ratio add-on (Figure 4) and EUR 975.9 billion is the combined Tier 1 MRC arising from the implementation of CRR/CRD IV of both risk-based and LR-based requirements (see also Figure 4).

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

Figure 11: Graphical representation of the actual impact (baseline) and implied impact (Scenario 1 and Scenario 2) on Tier 1 MRC from the implementation of risk-based capital requirements, implementing the output floor before and after the LR implementation, based on reduced estimation bias for risk-based Tier 1 MRC



Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 105 banks.

According to the hypothetical Scenario 1, the LR impact, when implementing only the leverage ratio, decreases by EUR 7.4 billion, which implies an overall impact of LR of –0.8%. There is no output floor impact under this scenario. It is worth mentioning that the analysis was conducted considering the Basel III target requirements only. The inclusion of other EU-specific capital requirements (e.g. the calculation of the countercyclical buffer, O-SIIs capital requirement, Pillar II requirements) would reduce the marginal contribution of the leverage ratio[38], which would remain close among all scenarios.

[38] Higher capital targets, due to the implementation of a higher buffer in the risk-based requirements, would lead to a more binding risk-based framework that, in turn, reduces the overall impact of the leverage ratio framework.

9. Net stable funding ratio

The BCBS standards include two regulatory measures of liquidity risk: (a) the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR). The LCR requires banks to have a sufficient level of high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) to withstand a stressful funding scenario for 30 days. The LCR was implemented in the EU as a binding minimum requirement in October 2015 (followed by a gradual phase-in of the minimum levels, starting at 60% in 2015 and reaching 100% in 2018)[39]. The monitoring of the LCR is assessed separately in the EBA's report on liquidity measures under Article 509(1) of the CRR. The NSFR is a longer-term structural ratio that addresses liquidity mismatches and provides incentives for banks to use stable sources to fund their activities. The NSFR has been introduced via the CRR2 and will be applied as a binding minimum requirement as of 28 June 2021. This section aims to monitor the impact of the BCBS standard on NSFR on EEA banks.

The NSFR is defined as the amount of available stable funding (ASF) relative to the amount of required stable funding (RSF). The Basel III framework intends that, from 1 January 2018, this ratio should be equal to or higher than 100%. The ASF is defined as the portion of capital and liabilities expected to be reliable over the 1-year time horizon considered by the NSFR. The amount of RSF is a function of the liquidity characteristics and residual maturities of the various assets held by a particular institution, as well as those of its off-balance-sheet exposures. Table 16 provides an overview of the NSFR levels by groups of banks and the amount of shortfall needed to comply with the 100% requirement set in the Basel III framework.

Table 16: NSFR and NSFR shortfall in stable funding

Bank group	NSFR (%)	Shortfall (EUR billion)
All banks	113.0	33.7
Group 1	111.8	29.3
Of which: G-SIIs	110.4	3.9
Group 2	119.4	4.4
Of which: large Group 2	117.9	4.3
Of which: medium-sized Group 2	123.3	0.0
Of which: small Group 2	121.5	0.1

Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 107 banks.

Overall, as of June 2019, banks in the sample needed additional stable funding of EUR 33.7 billion (Table 16), equivalent to 1.13% of the total assets (EUR 3.0 trillion) of all these banks that exhibit shortfalls. The need for stable funding is estimated by aggregating only the positive differences between RSF and ASF (RSF – ASF) — the deficit in the stable funding of banks whose NSFR is below the 100% requirement — and does not account for any surplus of stable funding observed in banks with an NFSR above the 100% requirement.

Figure 12 shows the distribution of NSFR per bank group, while Figure 13 illustrates the development of the NSFR over time using a constant sample of banks. The figure also shows the

[39] The monitoring of the LCR is assessed separately in the EBA's report on liquidity measures under Article 509(1) of the CRR. The report is published simultaneously with the present report.

changes in the NSFR components (ASF and RSF), showing which is the main driver of the NSFR change in each period.

Figure 12: Distribution of NSFR by bank group (NSFR/100%)



Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 107 banks.

Figure 13: NSFR (right-hand scale, rhs) (%) and change in its determinants (left-hand scale, lhs) of the constant sample (%)



Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 107 banks.

The collected data show that, between June 2011 and June 2019, the average NSFR followed a positive trend and increased by 2770 basis points. The driver of the continuous increase varies between the different periods and has been either an increase in the AFS or a reduction of the RSF. The significant increase in banks' NSFRs in December 2013 was driven by a major increase in the AFS, which may also have been driven by the revisions made by the BCBS, which were considered for the first time in the data collection referring to December 2013.

The shortfall in stable funding, needed to meet the 100% ratio requirement, is reduced, compared with June 2011, by 99.3% (from EUR 1 138 billion to EUR 8 billion) for Group 1 banks and by 100%

(from EUR 155 billion to EUR 0) for Group 2 banks (Figure 14). Banks with shortfalls should become compliant with the NSFR rules by the time the NSFR becomes binding in the EU[40].

Figure 14: Development of the NSFR shortfall of ASF over time, by bank group — constant sample (EUR billion)



Source: EBA QIS data (June 2019); sample: 49 banks.

[40] The implementation of the NSFR in the EU includes some differences from the Basel III definition of the NSFR, such as treatment of EU sovereign bonds.

10. Annex

10.1 Methodology for the estimation of the impact per category

10.1.1 Credit risk impact

$$\%\Delta T1MRC(Credit\ risk) = \%\Delta T1MRC(SA) + \%\Delta T1MRC(IRB\ approach) + \%\Delta T1MRC(Securitisation) + \%\Delta T1MRC(CCP)$$

%ΔT1MRC(Credit risk) is the percentage difference in MRC attributed to credit risk;
%ΔT1MRC(SA) is the percentage difference in MRC attributed to the standardised approach for credit risk;
%ΔT1MRC(IRB) is the percentage difference in MRC attributed to the internal ratings-based approach to credit risk;
%ΔT1MRC(Securitisation) is the percentage difference in MRC attributed to the revisions in the securitisation framework;
%ΔT1MRC(CCP) is the percentage difference in MRC attributed to the CCP framework.

Standardised approach for credit risk

$$\%\boldsymbol{\Delta T1MRC(SA)} = \frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{array}{c}\text{'}\boldsymbol{Final\ Basel\ III\ SA_{RWA}}\text{'}\times \\ (\boldsymbol{Tier1_{MRC}}\% \pm \boldsymbol{capital\ conservation\ buffer}\% \pm \boldsymbol{G_{SIIs}surcharge}\%)\end{array}\right\} - \sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{array}{c}\text{'}\boldsymbol{CRR\_CRDIV\ SA_{RWA}}\text{'}\times \\ (\boldsymbol{Tier1_{MRC}}\% \pm \boldsymbol{capital\ conservation\ buffer}\% \pm \boldsymbol{G_{SIIs}surcharge}\%)\end{array}\right\}\right]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\begin{array}{c}\max\{\text{'}\boldsymbol{CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ risk\_based\ Tier1\ MRC}\text{'}, \\ \text{'}\boldsymbol{CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ LR\_based\ Tier1\ MRC}\text{'}\}\end{array}}$$

where Tier 1 MRC = 6% and capital conservation buffer = 2.5%.

IRB approach for credit risk

$$\%\Delta T1MRC(IRB) = \frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{array}{c}\text{'}Final\ Basel\ III\ IRBA_{RWA}\text{'}\times \\ (Tier1_{MRC}\% + capital\ conservation\ buffer\% + G_{SIIs}surcharge\%) \\ -(\min(Amount\ of\ IRB\ deficit\ of\ provisions\ added\ to\ revised\ T1\ MRC, 0)) \\ +Amount\ currently\ risk\ weighted\ by\ art.49\ but\ deducted\ to\ T1\ under\ Basel\ III\end{array}\right\} - \sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{array}{c}\text{'}CRR\_CRDIV\ IRBA_{RWA}\text{'}\times \\ (Tier1_{MRC}\% + capital\ conservation\ buffer\% + G_{SIIs}surcharge\%) \\ -(min\ (Amount\ of\ IRB\ deficit\ of\ provisions\ added\ to\ current\ T1\ MRC, 0)\end{array}\right\}\right]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\begin{array}{c}\max\{\text{'}CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ risk\_based\ Tier1\ MRC\text{'}, \\ \text{'}CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ LR\_based\ Tier1\ MRC\text{'}\}\end{array}}$$

Securitisation

$$\%\Delta T1MRC(Sec.) =$$

$$\frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{matrix}'Final\ Basel\ III\ Sec_{RWA}'\times\\(Tier1_{MRC}\%+capital\ conservation\ buffer\%+G_{SIIs}surcharge\%)\end{matrix}\right\}-\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{matrix}'CRR\_CRDIV\ Sec_{RWA}'\times\\(Tier1_{MRC}\%+capital\ conservation\ buffer\%+G_{SIIs}surcharge\%)\end{matrix}\right\}\right]\right]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\begin{matrix}\max\{'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ risk\_based\ Tier1\ MRC',\\'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ LR\_based\ Tier1\ MRC'\}\end{matrix}}$$

CCPs

$$\%\Delta T1MRC(CCP) =$$

$$\frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{matrix}'Final\ Basel\ III\ CCP_{RWA}'\times\\(Tier1_{MRC}\%+capital\ conservation\ buffer\%+G_{SIIs}surcharge\%)\end{matrix}\right\}-\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{matrix}'CRR\_CRDIV\ CCP_{RWA}'\times\\(Tier1_{MRC}\%+capital\ conservation\ buffer\%+G_{SIIs}surcharge\%)\end{matrix}\right\}\right]\right]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\begin{matrix}\max\{'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ risk\_based\ Tier1\ MRC',\\'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ LR\_based\ Tier1\ MRC'\}\end{matrix}}$$

10.1.2 Market risk impact

$$\%\Delta T1MRC(MR) =$$

$$\frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{matrix}'Final\ Basel\ III\ FRTB\ capital'\times 12.5\times\\(Tier1_{MRC}\%+capital\ conservation\ buffer\%+G_{SIIs}surcharge\%)\end{matrix}\right\}-\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{matrix}'CRR\_CRDIV\ market\ risk\ capital'\times 12.5\times\\(Tier1_{MRC}\%+capital\ conservation\ buffer\%+G_{SIIs}surcharge\%)\end{matrix}\right\}\right]\right]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\begin{matrix}\max\{'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ risk\_based\ Tier1\ MRC',\\'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ LR\_based\ Tier1\ MRC'\}\end{matrix}}$$

10.1.3 CVA impact

$$\%\Delta T1MRC(CVA) =$$

$$\frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{matrix}'Final\ Basel\ III\ CVA\ capital'\times 12.5\times\\(Tier1_{MRC}\%+capital\ conservation\ buffer\%+G_{SIIs}surcharge\%)\end{matrix}\right\}-\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{matrix}'CRR_{CRDIV}CVA\ capital'\times 12.5\times\\(Tier1_{MRC}\%+capital\ conservation\ buffer\%+G_{SIIs}surcharge\%)\end{matrix}\right\}\right]\right]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\begin{matrix}\max\{'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ risk\_based\ Tier1\ MRC',\\'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ LR\_based\ Tier1\ MRC'\}\end{matrix}}$$

10.1.4 Operational risk impact

$$\%\Delta T1MRC(Op\ risk) =$$

$$\frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{'Final Basel III operational risk capital'} \times 12.5 \times \\ (Tier1_{MRC}\% + \text{capital conservation buffer}\% + G_{SIIs}\text{surcharge}\%)\end{matrix}\right\} - \right.}{\left.\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{'CRR\_CRDIV operational risk RWA'} \times \\ (Tier1_{MRC}\% + \text{capital conservation buffer}\% + G_{SIIs}\text{surcharge}\%)\end{matrix}\right\}\right]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n}\begin{matrix}\max\{\text{'CRR\_CRDIV total risk\_based Tier1 MRC'}, \\ \text{'CRR\_CRDIV total LR\_based Tier1 MRC'}\}\end{matrix}}$$

Small banks calculate the MRC by simply calculating the BIC, which is a proxy for the risk exposure for a certain confidence level. The BIC is calculated in two steps. In the first step, the business indicator (BI) is the sum of three components — the interest, leases and dividends component; the services component; and the financial component — which are based on accounting figures. The second step assigns the BI to one of the three different BI buckets, i.e. bucket 1, 2 or 3, depending on its level. Each bucket has a greater marginal coefficient than the previous one, so large banks, with high BIs, will receive exponential MRC increases. More specifically, the first bucket, for BIs up to EUR 1 billion, has a marginal coefficient of 0.12; the second bucket, for BIs between EUR 1 billion and EUR 30 billion, has a marginal coefficient of 0.15; and the third bucket, for BIs above EUR 30 billion, has a marginal coefficient of 0.18. Thus, the new SA takes into account the fact that, during the financial crisis, large banks with more complex business models suffered much higher operational risk losses.

Large banks will also have to calculate the LC, as an additional proxy for risk exposure. The Basel III framework necessitates the use of LC for bucket 2 and bucket 3 banks. The proxy value of the LC is determined by multiplying the average annual operational loss of the past 10 years by 15. To calculate the average annual loss, the new framework requires the aggregation of all losses above the EUR 20 000 threshold. All in all, the BIC and LC are proxies for operational risk, but based on different input data, i.e. they are observing the operational risk from different viewpoints. While the BIC relies on stable, but less risk-sensitive, accounting data, the LC relies on risk-sensitive, but volatile, internal loss observations. To balance the risk sensitivity without excessive capital volatility, the ILM is used to adjust the BIC. The ILM compares the BIC and LC in a way that imposes a capital add-on where the LC is larger than the BIC; otherwise, it allows a capital discount.

The influence of the LC is limited by the dampening features of the logarithm and the exponent of 0.8 in the end-point formula for the calculation of the ILM. Although the calculation of the ILM is easy, thanks to the simple formula applied, it becomes complex because of the difficulty in gathering additional data. To gather comprehensive and sufficient loss data, banks need to implement clear processes to identify all relevant operational risk losses. The additional burden to fulfil these requirements should be limited to the banks that currently apply the basic indicator approach and belong to bucket 2 and bucket 3, as the current framework for AMA and SA banks requires them to have proper loss data collection already in place[41].

[41] See Article 320(a) of the CRR and Article 322(3) of the CRR.

The formula for the calculation of ILM is

ln[exp(1) – 1 + (LC/BIC)^0.8]

where the LC is calculated as 15 times the average losses above EUR 20 000 (with national discretion to increase this threshold to EUR 100 000).

BIC = 0.12 × BI for BI ≤ EUR 1 billion, BIC = EUR 120 million + 0.15 × (BI – EUR 1 billion) for EUR 1 billion < BI ≤ EUR 30 billion, and BIC = EUR 4470 million + 0.18 × (BI – EUR 30 billion) for BI > EUR 30 billion

where BI = ILDC average + SC average + FC average, ILDC = interest, lease and dividend component, SC = services component and FC = financial component.

When LC < BIC, then ILM < 1; when LC > BIC, then ILM > 1; when LC = BIC, then ILM = 1.

10.1.5 Output floor impact

$$\%\Delta T1MRC(Output\ Floor) =$$

$$\frac{\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n} \max\{0, `Final\ Basel\ III\ total\ SA equivalent_{RWA}' \times Output\ Floor\% - `Final\ Basel\ III\ total\ RWA'\} \times (Tier1_{MRC}\% + capital\ conservation\ buffer\% + G_{SIIs} surcharge\%)\right]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} max\{`CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ risk_{based} Tier\ 1\ MRC', `CRR/CRD\ IV\ total\ LR\_based\ Tier 1\ MRC'\}}$$

where *Final Basel III total SA equivalent RWA* = the total RWA, assuming that all exposures under internal models are exclusively calculated according to the pertinent standardised approaches under the revised BCBS package, i.e. market and credit risk; the new RWA amount is the SA equivalent;

Final Basel III total RWA = the total RWA under the proposed BCBS framework, i.e. where relevant, the calculation of RWA according to internal models is allowed; and

Output Floor % = 72.5%, which, when multiplied by the SA equivalent RWA, provides the output floor level for internal models' RWA.

10.1.6 Leverage ratio impact

$$\%\Delta T1MRC(LR) =$$

$$\frac{\left[\begin{array}{l}\sum_{i=1}^{n} \max\left\{\begin{pmatrix}0,\\ 'Final\ Basel\ III\ total\ LR_{based} T1\ MRC' - \\ 'Final\ Basel\ III\ total\ risk_{based} T1\ MRC'\end{pmatrix}\right\} - \\ \sum_{i=1}^{n} \max\left\{\begin{pmatrix}0,\\ 'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ LR_{based} T1\ MRC' - \\ 'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ risk_{based} T1\ MRC'\end{pmatrix}\right\}\end{array}\right]}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} \begin{matrix}\max\{`CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ risk\_based\ T1\ MRC', \\ 'CRR\_CRDIV\ total\ LR\_based\ T1\ MRC'\}\end{matrix}}$$

where *Final Basel III total LR-based T1 MRC = Final Basel III total leverage ratio exposure × (3% + 0.5 × G-SIIs surcharge) –* $(min(Amount\ of\ IRB\ deficit\ of\ provisions\ added\ to\ revised\ T1\ MRC, 0))$*;*

CRR/CRD IV total LR-based T1 MRC = CRR/CRD IV total leverage ratio exposure × 3% - $(min(Amount\ of\ IRB\ deficit\ of\ provisions\ added\ to\ revised\ T1\ MRC, 0))$*;* and

n is the number of banks in the sample.

The analysis adopts the BCBS methodology for estimating the leverage ratio impact[42]. This methodology quantifies the impact of the leverage ratio as the change in the LR add-ons between the proposed and current regulatory frameworks, as a metric of the change in the LR's constraining power in determining the total T1 MRC.

Figure 15: Integration of changes in risk-based and leverage-ratio-based MRC



Source: based on the BIS Basel III monitoring report as of December 2017.

The leverage ratio impact would be negative (see $\Delta LR_{Add.}$ in example 1 of Figure 15) if the Tier 1 LR add-on of the full implementation of the final Basel III framework (equal to 0 in example 1 of Figure

[42] See BCBS (2017), *Basel III monitoring report December 2017: Results of the cumulative quantitative impact study*.

15) were lower than the Tier 1 LR add-on of the full implementation of the CRR/CRD IV (positive in example 1 of Figure 15). This particular case indicates that the leverage ratio is less constraining under the final Basel III framework than under the CRR/CRD IV framework.

The leverage ratio impact would be positive (see $\Delta LR_{Add.}$ in example 3 of Figure 15) if the Tier 1 LR add-on of the full implementation of the final Basel III framework (positive in example 3 of Figure 15) were higher than the Tier 1 LR add-on of the full implementation of the CRR/CRD IV (0 in example 3 of Figure 15). This can be interpreted as the leverage ratio becoming more constraining under the final Basel III framework than under the CRR/CRD IV framework.

The leverage ratio impact would be 0 in cases where either the T1 LR add-on of the CRR/CRD IV and the T1 LR add-on of the final Basel III framework are both 0 (example 4, Figure 15) or the T1 LR add-on remained the same under the CRR/CRD IV and the final Basel III framework (example 2, Figure 15, where $\Delta LR^1_{Add.} = \Delta LR^2_{Add.}$, then $\Delta LR_{Add.} = 0$). Both cases illustrate that the LR is equally constraining under the CRR/CRD IV and the final Basel III frameworks. Figure 15 illustrates all four cases of the relationship between the T1 LR-based MRC and T1 risk-based MRC, under the CRR/CRD IV and final Basel III frameworks.

10.1.7 Capital shortfalls

Table 8 — Part 1 — column 'Risk-based and LR-based Tier 1'

$$\boldsymbol{T1Shortfall_{CRR\_CRD_{IV}}} = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{max\begin{bmatrix}'Risk\_based\_Tier1\_Shortfall_{CRR\_CRDIV}',\\ 'LR\_based\_Tier1\_Shortfall_{CRR\_CRDIV}'\end{bmatrix}\right\} = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{max\begin{bmatrix}max\,(0,'Risk\_based\_Tier1\_MRC_{CRR\_CRDIV}' - 'Actual\_Tier1'),\\ max\,(0,'LR\_based\_Tier1\_MRC_{CRR\_CRDIV}' - 'Actual\_Tier1')\end{bmatrix}\right\}$$

Table 8 — Part 2 — column 'Risk-based and LR-based Tier 1'

$$\boldsymbol{T1Shortfall_{Basel_{III}}} = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{max\begin{bmatrix}'Risk\_based\_Tier1\_Shortfall_{Basel\_III}',\\ 'LR\_based\_Tier1\_Shortfall_{Basel\_III}'\end{bmatrix}\right\} = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{max\begin{bmatrix}max\,(0,'Risk\_based\_Tier1\_MRC_{Basel\_III}' - 'Actual\_Tier1'),\\ max\,(0,'LR\_based\_Tier1\_MRC_{Basel\_III}' - 'Actual\_Tier1')\end{bmatrix}\right\}$$

Table 2 — column 'Capital shortfalls — CRR/CRD IV (fully phased in)' — 'Additional LR Tier 1'

$$\boldsymbol{Add.LR_{T1Shortfall_{CRR_{CRD_{IV}}}}} =$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{max\begin{bmatrix}max\,(0,'Risk\_based\_Tier1\_MRC_{CRR\_CRDIV}'-'Actual\_Tier1'),\\ max\,(0,'LR\_based\_Tier1\_MRC_{CRR\_CRDIV}'-'Actual\_Tier1')\end{bmatrix}\right\}$$
$$-\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{max\left[max\,(0,'Risk\_based\_Tier1\_MRC_{CRR\_CRDIV}'-'Actual\_Tier1')\right]\right\}$$

Table 2 — column 'Capital shortfalls — Basel III framework (2028)' — 'Additional LR Tier 1'

$$\boldsymbol{Add.LR_{T1Shortfall_{Basel_{III}}}}$$
$$=$$
$$\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{max\begin{bmatrix}max\,(0,'Risk\_based\_Tier1\_MRC_{Basel\_III}'-'Actual\_Tier1'),\\ max\,(0,'LR\_based\_Tier1\_MRC_{Basel\_III}'-'Actual\_Tier1')\end{bmatrix}\right\}$$
$$-\sum_{i=1}^{n}\left\{max\left[max\,(0,'Risk\_based\_Tier1\_MRC_{Basel\_III}'-'Actual\_Tier1')\right]\right\}$$

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