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NOTE

From: General Secretariat of the Council
To: Delegations

Subject: **Proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on amending Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy**
- Presidency compromise

Delegations will find in ANNEX Presidency compromise on the above Commission proposal to be discussed at the 31 March 2017 Working Party meeting.

TEXT MARKED IN:

- **BOLD-UNDERLINED** FONT - ARE ADDITIONS TO THE LAST PRESIDENCY COMPROMISE
- UNDERLINED FONT - ARE ADDITIONS TO THE COMMISSION'S PROPOSAL FROM EARLIER COMPROMISES
- ~~STRICKEN THROUGH~~ FONT - ARE DELETIONS TO THE LAST PRESIDENCY COMPROMISE

2016/0363 (COD)

Proposal for a

DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL

on amending Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 114 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission,

After transmission of the draft legislative act to the national parliaments,

Having regard to the opinion of the European Central Bank¹

Having regard to the opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee²,

Acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,

Whereas:

(1) The Financial Stability Board (FSB) published the Total Loss-Absorbing Capacity (TLAC) Term Sheet ('the TLAC standard') on 9 November 2015 which was endorsed by the G-20 in November 2015. The **objective of the** TLAC standard ~~requires~~ **is to ensure that** global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), referred to as global systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) in the Union framework, ~~to hold a sufficient minimum amount of highly~~ **"have the** loss-absorbing ~~liabilities to ensure smooth and fast absorption of losses and recapitalisation~~ **capacity necessary to help ensure that, in and immediately following a** resolution, **critical functions can be continued without taxpayers' funds (public funds) or financial stability being put at risk"**. In its Communication of 24 November 2015³, the Commission committed **itself** to bring forward a legislative proposal by the end of 2016 that would enable the TLAC standard to be implemented by the internationally agreed deadline of 2019.

¹ OJ C , , p. .

² OJ C , , p. .

³ Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, "Towards the completion of the Banking Union", 24.11.2015, COM(2015) 587 final

(2) The implementation of the TLAC standard in the Union needs to take into account the existing institution-specific minimum requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities ('MREL') applicable to all Union institutions as laid down in Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council⁴. As TLAC and MREL pursue the same objective of ensuring that Union institutions have sufficient loss absorbing **and recapitalisation** capacity, the two requirements should be complementary elements of a common framework. Operationally, **the Commission proposed that** the harmonised minimum level of the TLAC standard **for G-SIIs** ('the TLAC minimum requirement') should be introduced in Union legislation through amendments to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council⁵, while the institution-specific add-on for G-SIIs and the institution-specific **requirement** for non-G-SIIs should be addressed through targeted amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU and Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council⁶. The relevant provisions of this Directive as regards the ranking of unsecured debt instruments in insolvency hierarchy are complementary with those in the aforementioned pieces of legislation and in Directive 2013/36/EU⁷.

⁴ Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190

⁵ Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p.1

⁶ Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 July 2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1

⁷ Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338

(3) Member States should ensure that institutions should have sufficient loss-absorbing **and recapitalisation** capacity **in accordance with resolution plans** -to ensure smooth and fast absorption of losses and recapitalisation with a minimum impact on financial stability and taxpayers. This should be achieved through constant compliance by institutions with a TLAC minimum requirement that will be implemented in Union law by Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and a requirement for own funds and eligible liabilities as provided in Directive 2014/59/EU.

(4) The TLAC standard, that will be implemented in Union law by Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, requires **G-SIIs** to meet the minimum TLAC requirement, with certain exceptions, with subordinated liabilities that rank in insolvency below liabilities **excluded from TLAC** ('subordination requirement'). Under the TLAC standard, subordination should be achieved through the legal effects of a contract ('contractual subordination'), the laws of a given jurisdiction ('statutory subordination') or a given corporate structure ('structural subordination'). **Where required by** Directive 2014/59/EU ~~allows resolution authorities to request, on a case-by-case basis, that institutions~~ within its scope should meet their firm-specific requirement with subordinated liabilities so as to minimise the risk of legal challenge by creditors on the basis that their losses in resolution are higher than the losses that they would incur under normal insolvency proceedings (no creditor worse off principle).

(5) A number of Member States have amended or are in the process of amending the insolvency ranking of unsecured senior debt under their national insolvency law to allow their institutions to comply with the subordination requirement in an easier manner and, thereby, to facilitate resolution.

(6) The national rules adopted so far diverge significantly. The absence of harmonised Union rules creates uncertainty for issuing institutions and investors alike and makes the application of the bail-in tool for cross-border institutions more difficult. This could also result in competitive distortions on the internal market given that the costs for institutions to comply with the subordination requirement and the costs borne by investors when buying debt instruments issued by institutions may differ considerably across the Union.

(7) In its Report on Banking Union, the European Parliament called on the Commission to present proposals to further reduce the legal risks of claims under the no-creditor-worse-off principle, and, in its conclusions of 17 June 2016⁸, the Council invited the Commission to put forward a proposal on a common approach to the bank creditors' hierarchy to enhance legal certainty in case of resolution.

(8) It is, therefore, necessary to remove the significant obstacles in the functioning of the internal market and avoid distortions of competition resulting from the absence of harmonised Union rules on bank creditors' hierarchy and to prevent such obstacles and distortions from arising in the future. Consequently, the appropriate legal basis for this Directive should be Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), as interpreted in accordance with the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

(9) In order to reduce to a minimum the costs of compliance with the subordination requirement and any negative impact on funding costs, this Directive should allow Member States to keep, where applicable, the existing class of unsecured senior debt, which is less costly for institutions to issue than any other subordinated liabilities. In order to enhance the resolvability of institutions, this Directive should, nevertheless, require Member States to create a new asset-class of 'non-preferred' senior debt that should only be bailed-in during resolution- written down or converted into common equity Tier 1 instruments after other **own funds capital instruments and/or subordinated liabilities other than Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments**, but before other senior liabilities. Institutions should remain free to issue debt in both senior and 'non-preferred' senior classes while, of these two classes, only the 'non-preferred' senior class should be eligible to meet the subordination requirement. This should allow institutions to use for their funding or any other operational reasons the less costly senior debt while issuing debt in the new 'non-preferred' senior class for compliance **to obtain funding while complying** with the subordination requirement.

⁸ Council conclusions of 17 June 2016 on a roadmap to complete the Banking Union: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/press-releases-pdf/2016/6/47244642837_en.pdf

(10) To ensure that the new 'non-preferred' senior class of debt instruments meet the eligibility criteria **as described in the TLAC standard** and **as set out in** Directive 2014/59/EU, and, thereby, enhance legal certainty, Member States should ensure that ~~their initial~~ **these debt instruments have an original** contractual maturity ~~is of at least~~ one year, that they **are not derivatives or** have no embedded derivatives, and that the relevant contractual documentation related to their issuance explicitly refers to their ranking under normal insolvency proceedings. **Debt instruments with variable interest, due to a reference in the debt instrument to a reference interest rate, such as Euribor or Libor, would not be considered to have embedded derivatives.**

(11) To enhance legal certainty for investors, Member States should ensure that ordinary senior debt instruments **and other ordinary non-debt senior liabilities** have a higher priority ranking in their national insolvency laws than the new 'non-preferred' senior class of debt instruments ~~under normal insolvency proceedings~~. Member States should also ensure that the new 'non-preferred' senior class of debt instruments have a higher priority ranking than the priority ranking of own funds instruments ~~and~~ or any other subordinated liabilities **other than Additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments** ~~and that, contrary to such instruments or liabilities, the 'non-preferred' senior class of debt instruments could only be bailed in when the issuing institution is placed under resolution.~~

(12) Since the objectives of this Directive, namely to lay down harmonised rules for bank creditor hierarchy for the purposes of the Union recovery and resolution framework, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale of the action, be better achieved at Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve those objectives. In particular, this Directive should be without prejudice to other options provided in the TLAC standard to comply with the subordination requirement through other means than through statutory subordination.

(13) It is appropriate for the amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU provided for in this Directive to apply to liabilities issued on or after the date of application of this Directive ~~and to liabilities that have already been issued and are still outstanding as of that date.~~ However, for legal certainty purposes and to mitigate transitional costs in as much as possible, Member State should ensure that the insolvency ranking of all outstanding debt liabilities that institutions have issued before that date is governed by the laws of the Member States as they were adopted on [31 December 2016]. ~~Outstanding liabilities should thus continue to be subject to the regulatory requirements set out in Directive 2014/59/EU and the relevant national law in the version that was adopted on [31 December 2016].~~ To the extent that certain national laws as adopted on [31 December 2016] could have already addressed the objective of allowing institutions to comply with the subordination requirement, part or all outstanding liabilities issued prior to the date of application of this Directive may have the same insolvency ranking as the 'non-preferred' senior debt instruments issued under the conditions of this Directive. In addition ~~Nevertheless,~~ Member States may, after 31 December 2016 and before the date of application of this Directive, adapt their national laws governing the ranking in normal insolvency proceedings of debt instruments issued after the date of application of such laws only in order to comply with the conditions laid down in this Directive. In this case, only the claims resulting from the debt liabilities issued before the application of this new national law continue to be governed by the laws of the Member States as they were adopted on [31 December 2016].

(14) This Directive should not prevent Member States from providing that be applicable to all institutions and entities, including certain holding companies, that are subject to the Union resolution framework as it results from the application of Directive 2014/59/EU. In order to provide for sufficient legal certainty, the rules on the insolvency ranking provided by this Directive; ~~Member States may should continue to apply the rules on the insolvency ranking provided by this Directive to when the issuing entities that are no longer subject to the Union resolution framework due, in particular,~~ to the divestment of their credit or investment activities to a third party.

(15) This Directive harmonises the ranking under normal insolvency proceedings of debt instruments and does not cover the insolvency ranking of deposits beyond the existing applicable provisions of Directive 2014/59/EU. Therefore, this Directive should be without prejudice to national laws of Member States governing normal insolvency proceedings that cover the insolvency ranking of deposits that has not already been harmonised by Directive 2014/59/EU. By [date – 3 years after date of entry into force of this Directive], the Commission should review the application of Directive 2014/59/EC with regard to the ranking of deposits in insolvency and assess in particular the need for any further amendments thereof.

HAVE ADOPED THIS DIRECTIVE:

Article 1

Amendments to Directive 2014/59/EU

1. **In Article 2(1), point (48) is replaced by the following:**

“(48) 'debt instruments':

- (i) for the purpose of points (g) and (j) of Article 63(1), means bonds and other forms of transferrable debt, instruments creating or acknowledging a debt, and instruments giving rights to acquire debt instruments; and**
- (ii) for the purpose of Article 108, means bonds and other forms of transferrable debt and instruments creating or acknowledging a debt.”**

2. Article 108 shall be replaced by the following:

“Article 108

Ranking in insolvency hierarchy

1. Member States shall ensure that in national law governing normal insolvency proceedings:

(a) the following have the same priority ranking which is higher than the ranking provided for the claims of ordinary unsecured creditors:

(i) that part of eligible deposits from natural persons and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises which exceeds the coverage level provided for in Article 6 of Directive 2014/49/EU;

(ii) deposits that would be eligible deposits from natural persons, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises were they not made through branches located outside the Union of institutions established within the Union.

(b) the following have the same priority ranking which is higher than the ranking provided for under point (a):

(i) covered deposits;

(ii) deposit guarantee schemes subrogating to the rights and obligations of covered depositors in insolvency.

2. Member States shall ensure that, for entities referred to in points (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1), ordinary unsecured claims shall, in national law governing normal insolvency proceedings, have a higher priority ranking than that of unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments which meet the following conditions:
- (a) the original contractual maturity of **the** debt instruments is at least one year;
 - (b) they **are not derivatives and** have no embedded derivatives; and,
 - (c) the ~~prospectus and any other~~ relevant contractual documentation **and, where applicable, the prospectus**, related to the issuance explicitly refers to the **lower** ranking under this paragraph.
3. Member States shall ensure that unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments that meet the conditions laid down in **points (a),(b) and (c) of** paragraph 2 shall have a higher priority ranking in national law governing normal insolvency proceedings than the priority ranking of claims resulting from instruments referred to in points (a) to (d) of Article 48(1).
4. **Without prejudice to paragraphs 5 and 6,** Member States shall ensure that their national laws governing normal insolvency proceedings as they were adopted at [31 December 2016] apply to ~~ordinary~~ the ranking in normal insolvency proceedings of unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments issued by entities referred to in points (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) prior to [date of application of this Directive].
- 5.** ~~The first subparagraph shall not apply where~~ **Where** a Member State, after 31 December 2016 and before the date of application of this Directive, has adopted a national law governing the ranking in normal insolvency proceedings of **claims resulting from debt instruments issued after the date of application of such national law which comply and before the date of application of this Directive,** ~~the first subparagraph 4 shall not apply to such claims resulting from debt instruments issued after the entry into force of that national law provided that it the national law complies with the conditions set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 following:~~

(a) that national law provides that, for entities referred to in points (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Article 1(1), ordinary unsecured claims shall, in normal insolvency proceedings, have a higher priority ranking than that of unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments which meet the following conditions:

(i) the original contractual maturity of the debt instruments is at least one year;

(ii) they are not derivatives and have no embedded derivatives; and

(iii) the relevant contractual documentation and, where applicable, the prospectus, related to the issuance explicitly refers to the lower ranking under this paragraph;

(b) that national law provides that unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments that meet the conditions laid down in point (a) of this paragraph shall, in normal insolvency proceedings, have a higher priority ranking than the priority ranking of claims resulting from instruments referred to in points (a) to (d) of Article 48(1).

6. Member States which, prior to 31 December 2016 have adopted a national law governing normal insolvency proceedings whereby unsecured claims resulting from debt instruments issued by entities referred to in points (a),(b),(c) and (d) of Article 1(1) are split into two or more different priority rankings or where the priority ranking of debt instruments is changed shall ensure as regards all other liabilities with the same ranking, may provide that instruments with the lowest priority ranking among those ordinary unsecured claims have the same ranking as the one referred to in paragraph 2 (a),(b) and (c) and paragraph 3. [senior non-preferred]

5. Paragraphs 2 and 3 shall continue to apply to debt instruments issued in accordance with those provisions when the entities referred to in points (c) and (d) of Article 1(1) that issued such instruments are no longer subject to this Directive [BRRD].

Article 2
Transposition

1. Member States shall adopt and publish at the latest by [18 months from the date of entry into force of this Directive] the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They shall communicate the text of those measures to the Commission forthwith.

Member States shall apply those measures at the latest on [18 months from the date of entry into force of this Directive].

2. When Member States adopt the measures referred to in paragraph 1 ~~after 31 December 2016~~ **the date of entry into force of this Directive**, they shall contain a reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member States shall determine how such a reference is to be made.
3. Member States shall communicate the text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in the field covered by this Directive to the Commission and to European Banking Authority.

Article 2a
Review

By [date – 3 years after date of entry into force of this Directive], the Commission shall review the application of Article 108(1) and assess in particular the need for any further amendments with regard to the ranking of deposits in insolvency. The Commission shall submit a report thereon to the European Parliament and to the Council.

Article 3
Entry into force

This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Article 4
Addressees

This Directive is addressed to the Member States.

Done at Brussels,

For the European Parliament For the Council

The President

The President
